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INTRODUCTION 
A lender, such as a bank or insurance company, often enters into 
a loan agreement that contemplates the making of loans, or advances, 
at a future date. Advances that in fact are made subsequent to the 
initial advance are called "future advances." 
The lender may have required, as a condition to originally enter-
ing into the loan agreement, that the borrower arrange for a third 
party to guarantee or secure repayment of the advances. For a corpo-
rate borrower, the third party is frequently the borrower's subsidiary. 
Because the subsidiary's guarantee or security interest is made for the 
benefit of a lender to the parent corporation, the guaranty or the se-
curity interest is referred to as being "upstream."! 
Enforcement by the lender of upstream guaranties and upstream 
security interests may be subject to several types of attack? For ex-
ample, under certain circumstances, federal and state fraudulent con-
veyance laws may be used to invalidate upstream guaranties or 
security interests. The purpose of fraudulent conveyance laws is to 
invalidate transfers made or obligations· incurred by companies in-
tended to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors, or transfers made or 
obligations incurred by "insolvent"3 companies for which such com-
panies receive less than the statutorily mandated equivalent value in 
return. The effect of fraudulent conveyance laws is to make property 
• Adjunct Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University; 
B.S., 1971, New York University School of Engineering and Science; J.D., 1974, Columbia 
University School of Law. The author wishes to thank Professor David Gray Carlson for his 
insightful and helpful comments, and Mark J. Shapiro for his editorial assistance. 
1 See Alces, Generic Fraud and the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 9 Cardozo L. Rev. 
743,746-47 (1987) (distinguishing upstream, downstream and cross-stream guaranties) (citing 
Rosenberg, Intercorporate Guarantees and the Law of Fraudulent Conveyances: Lender Be-
ware, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 235, 238-39, 262-65 (1976». 
2 See Schwarcz & Varges, Guaranties and Other Third-Party Credit Supports, in Com-
mercial Lending Guide ch. 19 (forthcoming MB 1987). 
3 The terms "solvent" and "insolvent" used in this Article refer to the three financial tests 
set forth in § 548(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. III 
1985), only one of which refers to balance-sheet solvency. 
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so transferred reachable again by the creditors and the obligation so 
incurred no longer an obligation of the company.4 
Creditors may obtain fraudulent conveyance remedies under 
state law.s Additionally, if a company becomes the subject of a fed-
eral bankruptcy case, the trustee in bankruptcy also is provided the 
power to challenge fraudulent conveyances.6 Under section 548 of 
the Bankruptcy Code, a trustee in bankruptcy may invalidate a 
"transfer made" or an "obligation incurred" within one year before 
the date the petition in bankruptcy is filed if such "transfer" is made 
or "obligation" is incurred at a time when the subject company is 
"insolvent," and if it did not receive "reasonably equivalent valueH7 in 
return for such transfer or obligation.8 Accordingly, if a subsidiary 
that has granted an upstream guaranty or upstream security interest 
was at the time "insolvent," and a petition in bankruptcy is filed 
4 There is, however, authority that state fraudulent conveyance law does not void trans-
fers or obligations completely, but rather voids them insofar as the creditors are concerned. 
See U.F.C.A. §§ 4-7, 7A U.L.A. 474-576 (1985). 
5 State fraudulent conveyance law is frequently, although not always, based upon the Uni-
form Fraudulent Conveyance Act ("UFCA"). The UFCA, a product of the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, is the leading model of state fraudulent 
conveyance laws, and has been adopted in at least 22 states. See id. at 31 (Supp. 1987) (Cali-
fornia, North Dakota and Oklahoma have recently repealed their UFCA provisions bringing 
the number of adopting states down from 25 to 22). In 1984 the Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws proposed a new version of the UFCA, known as the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer 
Act ("UFTA"). See U.F.T.A. §§ 1-13, 7A U.L.A. 639-67 (1985 & Supp. 1987). 
6 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The debtor also is empowered under §§ 1107 
and 1108 with the rights of a trustee in bankruptcy. See id. §§ 1107-08. 
7 This Article assumes that the "reasonably equivalent value" test is not met. In a case 
where a\l or most of the loan proceeds are used by the parent corporation for its own benefit, 
e.g., Rubin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 661 F.2d 979, 993-94 (2d Cir. 1981), the 
assumption would be apparent. There is, however, at least one case holding that modem fi-
nancing techniques justify one member of a corporate family guaranteeing the debts of another 
member of the corporate family. See TeleFest, Inc. v. VU-TV, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 1368 (D.N.]. 
1984). On the other hand, there are cases where subsidiaries making upstream guaranties 
clearly do obtain "reasonably equivalent value" under § 548, such as where a parent corpora-
tion downstreams the loan proceeds to its subsidiary as a capital contribution. 
s Section 548(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985), 
provides that: 
(a) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in prop-
erty, or any obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or 
within one year before the date of the filing pf the petition, if the debtor voluntarily 
or involuntarily-
(1) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent to hin-
der, delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or became, on or after 
the date that such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred, indebted; or 
(2)(A) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such 
transfer or obligation; and 
(B)(i) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such obliga-
tion was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such transfer or obligation; 
(ii) was engaged in business or a transaction, or was about to engage in busi-
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within one year, and assuming that the subsidiary has not received 
reasonably equivalent value in return for the upstream guaranty or 
security interest, the trustee in bankruptcy may have a basis for at-
tacking the upstream guaranty or security interest as a fraudulent 
conveyance. 
This Article will examine the problems of timing that arise under 
section 548 with respect to upstream guaranties or upstream security 
interests that support future advances. Timing is important for two 
reasons. First, under section 548 a trustee in bankruptcy may only 
invalidate "obligations incurred" or "transfers made" within one year 
before the date a petition in bankruptcy is filed. If an upstream guar-
anty or security interest is deemed to be "incurred" or "made" 
outside this one-year "statute of limitations," a trustee in bankruptcy 
may not use section 548 to challenge it.9 Timing is also important 
because only transfers made or obligations incurred when the subsidi-
ary is insolvent or its equivalentlO may be fraudulent conveyances. 
Because solvency is determined when the transfer is made or the obli-
gation is incurred, it is necessary to address the issue of when the 
"obligation" under an upstream guaranty is "incurred" and when the 
"transfer" of an upstream security interest is "made" under section 
548. 
I. TIMING ISSUES AND THE RUBIN CASE 
Upstream guaranties or upstream security interests in support of 
future advances raise particularly difficult timing issues because at 
least three different events occur, although not necessarily in the fol-
lowing order, that might influence the timing decision: 
(a) The subsidiary agrees to guarantee or grant collateral to 
secure repayment of future advances to be made under the parent 
company's loan agreement. 
(b) Where collateral is granted, the lender files financing 
statements or otherwise perfects its security interest in the 
collateral. 
(c) The lender advances money to the parent company, either 
ness or a transaction, for which any property remaining with the debtor was an 
unreasonably small capital; or 
(iii) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur, debts that 
would be beyond the debtor's ability to pay as such debts matured. 
9 This does not mean the trustee in bankruptcy has no power to attack the upstream 
guaranty or security interest. Under §-544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, id. § 544(b) (1982), the 
trustee may exercise the state law rights of a creditor. Under most state laws, the statute of 
limitations is longer than one year. 
10 See supra notes 3 & 8. 
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at its discretion or pursuant to an earlier commitment in the loan 
agreement to make the advance. 
Each of the above events may be relevant in determining when an 
"obligation [is] incurred" under a guaranty and when a "transfer of [a 
security] interest" is made, within the meaning of section 548. 
If the lender makes an advance to the parent company on the 
same day that the subsidiary executes the upstream guaranty or secur-
ity interest, it is obvious that for the purposes of section 548 the obli-
gation is incurred or the transfer of the security interest is made on 
that date. Accordingly, the three financial tests under section 
548(a)(2) are measured, and the one-year statute of limitations com-
mences running, on the date of the advance. But the issue is not 
nearly so clear where the lender enters into a loan agreement that 
contemplates future advances, because the future advances may be 
made long after the time that the upstream guaranty or security inter-
est was executed. 
This timing issue has been addressed by the Second Circuit in 
Rubin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust CO. II In Rubin, the court held 
that the date the obligation is incurred, under an upstream guaranty 
supporting future advances, is not limited to the date that the guar-
anty is executed but also may include the date that the future advance 
is made. 12 Thus, an upstream guaranty supporting future advances, 
executed more than a year before bankruptcy, may be deemed to cre-
ate new obligations of the guarantor each time a future advance is 
made. Some of these future advances may well be made within a year 
prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. 
This has created considerable concern for commercial lenders 
that enter into loan agreements contemplating future advances sup-
ported by upstream guaranties or secured by upstream security inter-
ests. Under the rule in Rubin, a lender would have no assurance that 
its future advances would obtain the benefit of an ups~ream guaranty 
or security interest, to the extent that the subsidiary making such 
guaranty or security interest becomes bankrupt within a year Of the 
advances. 
Because of this uncertainty, the draftsmen of the Uniform Fraud-
ulent Transfer Act ("UFT A"),13 a recent revision of the Uniform 
Fraudulent Conveyance Act,14 have provided in section 6 that the 
time for determining when a guaranty obligation is incurred is the 
II 661 F.2d 979 (2d Cir. 1981). 
12 Id. at 990. 
13 U.F.T.A. §§ 1-13, 7A U.L.A. 639-67 {l985 & Supp. 1987). 
14 U.F.C.A. §§ 1-14, 7A U.L.A. 427-638 (1985). 
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date that the guaranty is executed, not the date of the future ad-
vanceY The UFTA, if it becomes state law, would effectively answer 
the timing question for purposes of state-law statutes of limitations. 
Section 548, however, has not been amended since the Rubin 
case. Thus, even if state law is modified to adopt section 6 of the 
UFTA, the Rubin case still would raise the timing uncertainty under 
federal bankruptcy law whenever a subsidiary guaranteeing future ad-
vances becomes bankrupt. This Article will focus on the federal rule 
created by Rubin, and the uncertainty resulting therefrom. 
This Article submits that the Rubin case should be limited to its 
facts. The loan agreement in Rubin that contemplated future ad-
vances was a discretionary facility.16 This Article will demonstrate 
that had the lender made a commitment to extend advances in the 
future, the proper time for determining when the obligation was in-
curred under the upstream guaranty (or, if the case involved a secur-
ity interest, when the transfer of the security interest was made) 
would be the time that the lender executed the commitment to lend. 
II. THE IMPACT OF SECTION 548 ON FUTURE ADVANCES 
SUPPORTED BY UPSTREAM GUARANTIES 
Rubin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. is a complicated case. 
What follows is a simplified version of the facts faced by the Second 
Circuit. P, the parent corporation, owned 100% of the stock of Sl 
and S2, its two subsidiaries. S 1 and S2 were in the business of cashing 
checks and selling money orders to the public. The sales staff of S 1 
and S2 consisted of numerous store owners. Because their check-
cashing business required continuous outlays of currency, the check 
cashers who served as sales agents of S 1 and S2 experienced a con-
stant need for cash. The management of P feared the temptation of 
these storeowners to delay remittance of money order sales proceeds 
and to retain such proceeds for use in their businesses. As a means of 
minimizing this temptation, P arranged for the storeowners to obtain 
15 The UFfA states that "an obligation is incurred: (i) if oral, when it becomes effective 
between the parties; or (ii) if evidenced by a writing, when the writing executed by the obligor 
is delivered to or for the benefit of the obligee." U.F.T.A. § 6 (5), 7A U.L.A. 659 (1985). 
16 That the advances in Rubin were discretionary is clear from two passages in the lower 
court's opinion. The first passage states: "Trent and Skowron would submit monthly lists 
requesting MHT [lender] to make loans to check cashers who were acting as sales agents for 
the Trent/Skowron enterprises. To the extent that the loans were approved and made by 
MHT, they would be covered by the guarant[y)''' Rubin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 
4 Bankr. 447, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (footnote omitted), vacated, 661 F.2d 979 (2d Cir. 1981). 
The second passage states: "[O]n or about December 6, 1976, ... MHT informed Trent and 
Skowron that it no longer desired to extend credit to out-of-state check casher sales agents." 
rd. at 452. 
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short-term bank financing from a lender, Manufacturers Hanover 
Trust Co. ("MHT"). Under the arrangement, MHT opened a credit 
line against which the storeowners were permitted to borrow for 
three-day periods. P guaranteed all these loans made by MHT. Sl 
and S2 in tum guaranteed P's obligation to MHT. 
The court in Rubin interpreted sections 67d(2)(a) and (b) under 
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the predecessor statute to section 548,17 
to hold that Sl and S~ "incurred" obligations on the date when the 
future advances in question were made, even though these advances 
were made long after the upstream guaranties were executed. 18 The 
court's basis for this conclusion was that "[e]ven after the [upstream] 
guarantees were executed, there could be no liability under them until 
MHT had actually loaned money to [the storeowners]."19 The court 
added that "[u]ntil the loans were made, there existed only a frame-
work through which [the subsidiaries making the upstream guaran-
ties] might incur obligations, but they had not done so yet."20 
The court's holding in Rubin perhaps is understandable insofar 
as it applies to MHT's credit line, in which future advances were dis-
cretionary. MHT alone determined, at the time each advance was 
requested by a storeowner, whether or not to advance the funds. 
Each time that MHT decided to advance funds to a storeowner, MHT 
could reassess the credit risk, including whether or not the advance 
would ultimately be repaid by the storeowner, and whether and when 
the upstream guaranties supporting the advance would be drawn 
upon. MHT also could reassess at such time whether Sl and S2, the 
subsidiaries making the upstream guaranties, then satisfied the three 
financial tests of section 548(a)(2). If Sl and 82 did not then satisfy 
these financial tests, MHT could refuse to make the requested ad-
vance, since it is discretionary. 
If, on the other hand, a lender is legally obligated to make future 
advances, that lender could not refuse to make a requested advance, 
even if the advance were supported by an upstream guaranty of a sub-
17 The holding in Rubin, decided under the old Bankruptcy Act, nonetheless should re-
main applicable under the Bankruptcy Code because the relevant statutory language-"obJiga-
tion incurred" and "transfer of an interest"-is almost identical in both statutes (compare 11 
U.S.C. § 548(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) with 11 U.S.C.A. app. § 107(d)(2)(a) (1979) (repealed 
(978» and because the Bankruptcy Code has been interpreted by reference to case law decided 
under the Bankruptcy Act to the extent that the Bankruptcy Code incorporates similar lan-
guage and concepts. See, e.g., Barr v. Weber (III re Carousel Candy Co.), 38 Bankr. 927, 936 
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984) (noting that Judge Kearse's observations about § 67(d) in Rubill had 
not lost their pertinence even though § 548 had replaced § 67(d». 
18 Rubin, 661 F.2d at 990. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
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sidiary of the borrower that fails to satisfy the three financial tests of 
section 548(a)(2) at the time of the request.21 
A clear understanding of when to measure the three financial 
tests under section 548(a)(2) and when the statute of limitations starts 
running is therefore desirable to encourage normal commercial lend-
ing transactions. A lender that has uncertainty regarding the enforce-
ability of upstream guaranties and security interests supporting its 
future advances may well be discouraged from extending a commit-
ment for a loan facility contemplating future advances. 
In addition to policy considerations, an analogy may be drawn 
from limitations of actions in tort law to support the view that the 
one-year statute of limitations under section 548 should begin running 
at the time that the guaranty of a committed loan facility is exe-
cuted.22 The statute of limitations for a tortious act generally begins 
to run when th~ tortious act is committed.23 For discretionary future 
advances, a separate tortious act may be committed each time the 
lender makes a future advance, because each advance creates a debt 
that is supported by the upstream guaranty of the subsidiary, which in 
tum may impose a loss upon the subsidiary's creditors. On the other 
hand, where future advances are to be made pursuant to a committed 
loan agreement, the lender no longer has discretion whether or not to 
make any requested advance; the last act of the lender within its con-
trol occurs when the loan commitment is executed. Thus, for a com-
mitted loan agreement, the "tortious act" would occur at the time 
that the upstream guaranty is executed. 
The foregoing analysis should not be qualified by the fact that 
injury to creditors of the subsidiary that has made the upstream guar-
anty may occur at a future date (e.g., when the upstream guaranty is 
enforced). Ordinarily, the statute of limitations for a tortious act be-
gins to run from the time the tortious act is committed, even though 
21 A prudent lender could make it a contractual condition precedent to each future ad-
vance that the subsidiary making the upstream guaranty satisfy the three financial tests of 
§ 548 (a) (2), see supra note 8 (setting out the three financial tests), at the time of each advance. 
But if the lender relies solely on the borrower's representation and warranty to that effect made 
at the time of each advance, the upstream guaranty still might be subject to challenge as a 
fraudulent conveyance if the representation and warranty subsequently turns out to be untrue. 
On the other hand, for the lender to require due diligence as to the subsidiary's compliance 
with these financial tests at the time of each future advance could be commercially impractical. 
22 Fraudulent conveyances are, after all, in the nature of torts. A lender that draws on the 
upstream guaranty of an insolvent subsidiary takes property that otherwise would generally be 
available to creditors of the insolvent subsidiary. Such an act seems analogous to a tort. 
23 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 899 comments c & e (1977). See also Albertson v. 
T.]. Stevenson & Co., 749 F.2d 223, 228-29 (5th Cir. 1984) (ordinarily, the invasion of the 
person's legally protected interest occurs when the tortious act is committed). 
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little, if any, actual damage occurs immediately upon commission of 
the act.24 The statute of limitations may bar recovery for subsequent 
damages, even if such damages are not ascertainable at the time the 
tort is committed.2s 
There is an exception to the foregoing rule where the tort in-
volves continuing or repeated injury. The statute of limitations then 
does not begin to run until the date of the last injury, or when the 
tortious acts cease. Successive actions for damages caused by a tort, 
however, can be maintained only where the tortfeasor is continually 
at fault; he cannot be charged as a continuing wrongdoer unless he 
has the right and is under the duty to terminate the cause of injury.26 
In the case of a committed loan agreement supported by an upstream 
guaranty, once the lender signs the loan agreement and the subsidiary 
executes the upstream guaranty, neither has a right or duty to termi-
nate its respective obligation. The one-year statute of limitations 
under section 548 therefore should begin running at the time the com-
mitted loan agreement and the upstream guaranty have been executed 
by the lender and the subsidiary, respectively. 
Accordingly, had the loan facility in Rubin been committed 
rather than discretionary, the court should have decided that the stat-
ute of limitations under section 548, applicable to the upstream guar-
anty of the future advance, would have already run. 
III. THE IMPACT OF SECTION 548 ON FUTURE ADVANCES 
SECURED BY UPSTREAM SECURITY INTERESTS: SHOULD 
THE RUBIN DECISION BE ApPLICABLE? 
The foregoing discussion concerned Rubin and the application of 
section 548 to upstream guaranties of future advances. As already 
mentioned, the same types of issues also could arise for upstream se-
curity interests securing future advances.27 For example, when a 
24 See, e.g., Bauman v. Centex Corp., 611 F.2d 1115, 1118 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing 54 C.l.S. 
Limitations of Actions § 168 (a), at 122-23 (1948». 
2S Id. at 1118. 
26 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 169 (a), at 129 (1948). There is, however, authority 
to the contrary. See id. n.81. 
27 An upstream guaranty may be secured or unsecured. Either way, it is analyzed as a 
guaranty, because the collateral would fall if the guaranty itself were voided. An upstream 
security interest, on the other hand, may directly secure a loan of a lender to the borrower; and 
that is what is being discussed in this part of the Article. . 
If an upstream guaranty is secured, and assuming the guaranty is effective, the grant of 
collateral would not be subject to attack as a fraudulent conveyance under § 548 because 
§ s48(d)(2)(A) defines "value" as including "securing of a present or antecedent debt:' 11 
u.s.c. § 548(d)(2)(A) (Supp. III 1985). However, a grant of collateral made by a subsidiary to 
secure an existing upstream guaranty may, depending upon the circumstances, be subject to 
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lender offers to make advances to the borrower, the lender may re-
quire one or more subsidiaries of the borrower to grant a security 
interest in its assets to secure repayment of the advances. It should be 
noted that security interests, in general, may properly secure future 
advances, whether or not made pursuant to a commitment.28 
In analyzing the upstream guaranties in Rubin under the prede-
cessor statute to section 548, the court focused on when the "obliga-
tions" are "incurred" under those guaranties. The granting of an 
upstream security interest does not, however, constitute an "obliga-
tion incurred" within the meaning of section 548. Rather, section 548 
applies to upstream security interests by virtue of the statutory phrase 
"transfer of an interest"29 in property. The granting by a subsidiary 
of an upstream security interest would constitute such a "transfer of 
an interest" under section 548.30 It is therefore necessary to deter-
mine under section 548 when the "transfer of an interest" is deemed 
to be made with respect to an upstream security interest that secures 
future advances. 
Section 548(d) governs when a security interest is deemed trans-
ferred. Section 548(d) states that the "transfer" of a security interest 
occurs when the security interest is "so perfected that a bona fide pur-
chaser from the [subsidiary making the upstream security interest] 
against whom applicable law permits such transfer to be perfected 
cannot acquire an interest in the property transferred that is superior 
to the interest in such property of the transferee [lender]."31 Thus, 
one must inquire as to when the upstream security interest has been 
"perfected" under applicable nonbankruptcy law governing matters 
of perfection. 
Section 9-303(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") 
governs perfection of a security interest.32 It states that a security 
attack as a "preference" under § 547 of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. § 547 (1982 & Supp. III 
1985). 
28 U.C.C. § 9-204 (1986). There are, however, some security interests not governed by the 
Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"), where the holder of the security interest may be Subject 
to the priority of liens arising prior to the making of future advances covered by such security 
interests. See, e.g., W.P. Fuller & Co. v. McClure, 48 Cal App. 185, 191-92, 191 P. 1027, 1030 
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1920); New York & Suburban Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Fi-Pen Realty 
Co., 133 N.Y.S.2d 33, 35 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954); Kratovil & Werner, Mortgages For Construc-
tion and the Lien Priorities Problem-The "Unobligatory" Advance, 41 Tenn. L. Rev. 311 
(1974). This Article will focus on security interests governed by the UCC. 
29 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
30 "Transfer" is defined to mean "every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, 
voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in prop-
erty, including retention of title as a security interest." 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(50) (Supp. 1987). 
31 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(I) (Supp. III 1985). 
32 U.C.C. § 9-303(1) (1986). 
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interest is perfected once it has "attached" and various routine steps 
required for perfection have been taken. 33 
Assuming that the routine steps for perfection, which may in-
clude the filing of uee financing statements or, in appropriate cases, 
physical possession of the collateral by the lender, will have been 
taken and completed at the time the lender originally signs the loan 
agreement, a second question must be answered: when has the secur-
ity interest "attached"? Whether a security interest has "attached" is 
governed by uee section 9-203.34 Attachment occurs when (a) there 
is an agreement to grant the security interest (which, for purposes of 
this Article, is assumed to be in place); (b) the subsidiary granting the 
upstream security interest has rights in the collateral (which, again, 
will be assumed); and (c) "value has been given."35 
In the case of a discretionary loan facility, where the lender has 
not promised to make advances, it is difficult to argue that any value 
has been given until the advances are actually made. Even after the 
initial advance has been made in a continuing discretionary loan facil-
ity, such that the lender has given some value, there is authority to the 
effect that value has not been given for an upstream security interest 
to the extent it secures subsequent, future advances.36 Accordingly, 
for an upstream security interest securing a discretionary future ad-
vance, it would appear that value is not given, and attachment does 
not occur, until the advance actually is made. This result is in accord 
with the decision in Rubin insofar as it applies to discretionary future 
advances supported by upstream guaranties. 
On the other hand, where the future advance is made pursuant to 
a committed loan agreement, the result should be different. The loan 
commitment, by itself, should constitute the giving of "value" within 
the meaning of uec section 9-203. The term "value" is defined in 
uee section 1-201(44) in several alternative ways. Under 1-201(44), 
a person gives "value" for rights if he acquires them "in return for a 
binding commitment to extend credit . . . whether or not drawn 
upon," or "generally, in return for any consideration sufficient to sup-
33 Id. These routine steps include the filing of UCC financing statements for most types of 
collateral governed by the UCC, see id. § 9-302, and physical possession of the collateral for 
certain other types of collateral, see id. § 9-305. See also id. §§ 9-103, 9-304 & 9-306 (related 
rules governing the perfection of security interests). 
34 Id. § 9-203. 
35 Id. §§ 9-203(I)(a)-(c). 
36 See discussion in Dick Warner Cargo Handling Corp. v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc., 
746 F.2d 126, 131-33 (2d Cir. 1984). See also Carlson & Shu pack, Judicial Lien Priorities 
Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Part I, 5 Cardozo L. Rev. 287, 347 (1984) 
("Attachment and perfection with regard to a discretionary future advance, however, can be 
no earlier than the date on which the advance is made, at least under the 1972 UCC. "). 
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port a simple contract."37 There is no requirement under the uee 
that the entity whose assets are pledged must be the party who re-
ceives the value or consideration.38 It may be concluded, therefore, 
that for an upstream security interest securing future advances made 
pursuant to a commitment, value is given by the lender, and accord-
ingly the one-year statute of limitations begins running, at the time 
the loan agreement containing the commitment is executed, rather 
than the time that the future advance is made.39 
37 U.C.C. § 1-201(44) (1986) provides: 
Except as otherwise provided with respect to negotiable instruments and bank col-
lections (sections 3-303, 4-208 and 4-209) a person gives "value" for rights if he 
acquires them 
(a) in return for a binding commitment to extend credit or for the extension of 
immediately available credit whether or not drawn upon and whether or not a 
chargeback is provided for in the event of difficulties in collection; or 
(b) as security. for or in total or partial satisfaction of a pre-existing claim; or 
(c) by accepting delivery pursuant to a pre-existing contract for purchase; or 
(d) generally, in return for any consideration sufficient to support a simple 
contract. 
38 It is clear that in detennining whether "value has been given" under UCC § 9-203(1)(b), 
the focus should be on what is given by the lender, and not necessarily on what is received by 
the subsidiary that grants the upstream security interest. (If the focus were on what the sub-
sidiary receives, there would be a question in many cases whether value is given because the 
subsidiary often does not receive any direct benefit from the advances made to its parent corpo-
ration.) First, the use of the tenn "given" in § 9-203(l)(b), as a matter of statutory interpreta-
tion, focuses on the giver of value (the lender) as opposed to the party receiving the value. The 
definition of "value" in UCC § 1-201(44) likewise focuses on the giving of value. Second, the 
term "value" includes "any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract." It is black 
letter law that there would be sufficient contract consideration for the subsidiary to grant the 
upstream security interest supporting advances made to its corporate parent, even if the sub-
sidiary fails to receive any benefit from such advances, because the lender, in making its loan 
commitment or making the advances, suffers a legal detriment. See, e.g., J. Calamari & J. 
Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 4-1, at 134 n.12 (2d ed. 1977) ("[I]t is well settled that the 
detriment [loan commitment or advances] may ... run to a person other than the promisor 
[subsidiary]."). See also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 79 comment b, illustration 1 
(1981) ("A contracts to sell property to B. As a favor to B, who is C's friend, and in considera-
tion of A's perfonnance of the contract, C guarantees that B will pay the agreed price. A's 
perfonnance is consideration for C's promise."). Accord Putnam Realty Inc. v. Tenninal 
Moving & Storage Co. (In re Terminal Moving & Storage Co.), 631 F.2d 547, 551 (8th Cir. 
1980). 
39 This distinction between commitments to lend and discretionary future advances is con-
sistent with the 1972 version of the UCC. For example, § 9-301(4) of the UCC provides that a 
lien creditor takes subject to a security interest that secures future advances made "pursuant to 
a commitment entered into without knowledge of the lien." U.C.C. § 9-301(4) (1986). UCC 
§ 9-307(3) sets forth a similar rule with respect to the rights of certain buyers of goods. Id. 
§ 9-307(3). See Dick Warner Cargo Handling Corp., 746 F.2d at 133. See also U.C.C. § 9-
312(7) (1986) (detailing priority of perfected security interests). 
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IV. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING COMMITMENTS 
AND DISCRETIONARY FUTURE ADVANCES 
The foregoing discussion raises the issue of what constitutes a 
"commitment" to lend. Although a complete discussion of this issue 
is beyond the scope of this Article, the inclusion in the loan agreement 
of conditions precedent to the obligation of the lender to make ad-
vances should not, by itself, make the advances discretionary. Rather, 
the analysis should be whether, at the time the loan agreement is exe-
cuted, the lender has sole and unfettered discretion in determining 
whether or not to make requested future advances. If the lender does 
not have such discretion, the future advance would be made pursuant 
to a commitment.40 This is consistent with section 9-105(1)(k) of the 
UCC which states that "[a]n advance is made pursuant to commit-
ment [it] the secured party has bound himself to make it, whether or 
not a subsequent event of default or other event not within his control 
has relieved or may relieve him from his obligation[.]"41 
Nevertheless, lenders and borrowers may wish to enter into dis-
cretionary loan facilities involving future advances supported by up-
stream guaranties and security interests. How should they do it to 
preserve the lender's benefit of the bargain? At a minimum, they 
should obtain, as a condition to making each future advance, the same 
representations and warranties as to the subsidiary's financial condi-
tion and compliance with the three financial tests set forth in section 
548(a)(2)(B) as was obtained at the time the loan facility was origi-
nally extended. Compliance by the subsidiary at the time of the fu-
ture advance with all three financial tests of section 548 (a) (2) (B) 
would be a defense (absent fraudulent intent) to a challenge under 
section 548 that the upstream guaranty or security interest would be 
voidable, as regards such advance. There is, however, a risk that 
these representations and warranties are made incorrectly. A lender 
could gain additional comfort by performing the same level of due 
diligence regarding these financial tests as was made originally. 
Whether that is practicable would have to be examined on a case by 
case basis. 
40 An issue that the court in Rubin did not focus on, but the answer to which appears 
evident from the court's reasoning, is whether a discretionary future advance starts the statute 
of limitations running not only for an upstream guaranty or security interest supporting that 
advance but also for the same upstream guaranty or security interest supporting prior ad-
vances. The statute of limitations, even for a discretionary future advance, should only begin 
running anew as to upstream guaranties and security interests insofar as they support that 
particular future advance. 
41 V.C.C. § 9-105(l)(k) (1986). 
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CONCLUSION 
Logic and policy compel the result that the Rubin case should be 
limited to its facts. An upstream guaranty or security interest sup~ 
porting a discretionary future advance is, respectively, an "obligation 
incurred" or a "transfer made" within the meaning of section 548 
only once that advance is actually made. On the other hand, if the 
future advance is to be made pursuant to a committed loan agree~ 
ment, then the "obligation [would be] incurred" or "transfer [would 
be] made" when the loan agreement has been executed and the up~ 
stream guaranty has been made, or the upstream security interest has 
been perfected. 

